UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-23-2016

The David and Marvel Benton Trust v. McCarty
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43326

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"The David and Marvel Benton Trust v. McCarty Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43326" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6021.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6021

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
STATE OF IDAHO

THE DAVID AND MARVEL BENTON
TRUST,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

DOROTHY B. McCARTY,
Defendant-Appellant.

_________ _______

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 43326

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
HONORABLE Gregory M. Moeller, District Judge, Presiding

Gary L. Cooper, Esq.
COOPER & LARSEN, Chtd.
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229

Attorneys for Respondent

John M. Ohman, Esq.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER, Chtd
510 "D" Street
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1600

Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. ........................... .iv

IL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................. .......................... 1
A.

Nature Of The Case ................................. ............................... 1

B.

Course Of Proceedings ................................. ........................... 1

C.

Respondent Trust's Arguments To The District Court ...................... 2

D.

District Court's Decision On Summary Judgment ........................... 2

E.

Summary Of Appellant McCarty's Arguments On Appeal ................. 3

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................. ................................ 6

IV.

ISSUES ON APPEAL ................................. ................................. .... 11

V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ................................. ....................... 11

VI.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................. ............................... 12

VII.

A.

Standard Of Review Of A Decision On Summary Judgment ............... 12

B.

Standard Of Review Where A Deed Is Found To Be Ambiguous .......... 12

i\RGUMENT ................................ ................................ ................. 13
A.

TITLE TO THE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED TO MCCARTY ON JULY
1, 2010 ................................. ................................. ............... 13
1. Under Idaho Law, Signing And Delivering A Deed Are All That Is
Required To Convey Title From Grantor To Grantee .................... 13
2. Under Idaho Law, A Deed Does Not Need To Be Notarized In Order
To Convey Title From Grantor To Grantee ................................. 14
3. A Deed Is Not Required To Be Recorded In Order To Convey Title ... 15
4. McCarty Took Title In July Of 2010. Therefore The November 27, 2010
Second Amendment To The Trust Has No Bearing On Her Title ....... 16

· APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - i

B.

THE FACT THAT THE BENTO NS DID NOT NOTE ON THE
QUITCLAIM DEED THAT THEY WERE SIGNING AS TRUSTEES HAS
NO EFFECT ON THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OR MCARTY'S TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY ...................... ...................... ...................... 16

C.

UNDER IDAHO CODE § 55-606, THE QUITCLAIM DEED AND THE
WARRANTY DEED TO DOROTHY MCCARTY ARE CONCLUSIVE
AGAINST THE TRUST. THE TRUST CANNOT CHALLENGE ITS OWN
DEED. THEREFORE, THE TRUST IS BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS
QUIET TITLE ACTION AS A MATTER OF LAW ...................... ...... 20

D.

THE PROPERTY DESRIPTION ON PAGE 1 OF THE JULY 1, 2010
QUITCLAIM IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVEY TITLE TO MCCARTY ..... 22
1.

The Goal Of The Judicial Process Is To Give Effect To The Intention Of
The Gran tors ....................... ....................... ....................... ........ 22

2.

In Idaho, Ambiguities In A Legal Description Of A Deed Raise
Questions Of Fact To Be Resolved Through The Granto rs' Intent And
All Surrounding Circumstances ...................... ...................... ..... 23

3.

The Trust's Claims That The Legal Description On The Quitclaim Deed
Is Inadequate Have No Merit ....................... ....................... ........ 25

4.

The Affidavits Of Licensed Professional Engineers And Land Surveyors
Make Clear That The Legal Description Is Both (1) Accurate and
Complete; and (2) Superior To A Metes And Bounds Description ..... 28

E.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S PERCEIVED AMBIGUITY IN THE LEGAL
DESCRIPTION HAS NO FOUNDATION AND IS CLEARLY RESOLVED
BY THE EXPERT TESTIMONY ...................... ...................... ...... 33

F.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY HAD NO VALID REASON TO REQUEST
THAT A "METES AND BOUNDS" DESCRIPTION BE ADDED TO THE
QUITCLAIM DEED ...................... ...................... ...................... 35

G.

THE MINOR CHANGES MADE TO THE QUITCLAIM DEED AT THE
REQUEST OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY WERE UNNECESSARY AND
HAD NO EFFECT ON THE VALIDITY OF MCCARTY'S TITLE ......... 37

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

ii

H.

EVEN IF DEEMED NECESSARY, THE MINOR CHANGES TO THE
QUITCLAIM DEED ARE AUTHORIZED AND ENFORCED UNDER THE
LEGAL DOCTRINES OF REFORMATION , CORRECTION DEED,
AND/OR CORRECTION BY INTERLINEA TION ....................... ...... 38

I.

THE "SECOND AMENDMENT" TO THE TRUST HAS NO BEARING OR
EFFECT ON McCARTY'S TITLE TO THE PROPERTY .................. 39
1.

The Trust's Argument Based On The Second Amendment To The
Trust ...................... ...................... ...................... ........... 39

2.

The Trust's Arguments Fail For Numerous Reasons .................. 39

VIII. CONCLUSION ...................... ...................... ...................... ............... 41

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

iii

I.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
IDAHO CASES

C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001) ................................. 24, 29
City of Kellogg v. Mission }vftn. Interests, Ltd. Co.,
135 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 920 (2000) ............................................................... 26
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 199 P.2d 264 (1948) ................................. 14
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Schrock, 150 Idaho 817, 252 P.3d 98 (2011) .................... .41
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 990 (1969) ....................................... 23
Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157,525 P.2d 352 (1974) ............................... 16, 18, 21
Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 777 P.2d 255 (1989) ............................................. 24
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006) ..................................... 22
Hunt v. Hunt, 110 Idaho 649,718 P.2d 560 (Ct.App. 1985) ................................. 14
Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6,293 P.3d 630 (2012)
.............................................................................................. 1

13,23,24

J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 167 P.3d 748, (2006) ........................... .41
111.atheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 572 P.2d 861 (1977) ...................................... 15
Mollandorfv. Derry, 95 Idaho 1,501 P.2d 199 (1972) ................................... 14, 23
Norton v. Dept. of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 500 P.2d 825 (1972) ....................... 22
Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009) .......................... 26, 27, 32, 37
Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d 161
(Ct.App. 1989) ......................................................................................... 40
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009) ........................................ 22
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,243 P.3d 1069 (2010) ........... 12

· APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - iv '

IDAHO STATUTES
Idaho Code § 12-121 .............. -. ...................... ...................... ............. 11
Idaho Code§ 55-601. ...................... ...................... .................. 13, 14, 15
Idaho Code§ 55-606 ...................... ................ 3, 4, 11, 12, 15, 20, 21, 22, 40
Idaho Code§ 55-801 ...................... ...................... ...................... ....... 15
Idaho Code § 55-812 ...................... ...................... ...................... ....... 15

IDAHO COURT RULES
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 .......................... .......................... .......................... .... 11
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) .......................... .......................... ........ 11
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) .......................... .......................... ............. 12

CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTION S
Ames v. Fallert, 657 P.2d 224 (Or.CLApp. 1983) ...................... ...................... .. 19
Carlson v. Stair, 472 P.2d 598 (Wash.Ct.App. 1970) ...................... .................... 21
Jerome v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 279 S.E.2d 42 (N.C.Ct.App. 1981) ...................... .... 19
Kessinger v. Logan, 779 P.2d 263 (Wash. 1989) ...................... ...................... .... 21
Maxwell v. Sullivan, 166 So. 575 (Fla. 1936) ...................... ...................... ........ 21
lvforse, Trustee in Liquidation for The Two Antique Dealers, L.L.C. v. Barwick,
84 Va. Cir. 496 (Va.Cir.Ct. 2012) ...................... ...................... ...................... 20
Phillips v. May, 2004 Ohio App. Lexis 5313 (Ohio Ct.App. 2004) .................... 17, 18
Smith v. Cram, 230 P. 812 (Or. 1925) ...................... ...................... ................. 19
Standring v. Mooney, 127 P.2d 401 (Wash. 1942) ...................... ...................... .. 19

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

v·

Appellant Dorothy B. McCarty hereby files her opening brief in the
appeal of this matter.

II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This suit is a quiet title action filed by two children who have taken
control of their parents' Trust. These children are now trying to revoke a deed
executed years earlier by their parents from the Trust to the eldest daughter,
Appellant Dorothy B. McCarty ("McCarty"). The Respondent in this suit is the
"David and Marvel Benton Trust," which is now controlled by McCarty's two
younger siblings, David Benton II and Barbara Baker (hereinafter "the Trust").
The parents, David and Marvel Benton, signed and delivered both a
Quitclaim Deed and a Warranty Deed to the property at issue to McCarty on
July 1, 2010. The property is located at 550 Linden Drive in Idaho Falls, Idaho,
and consists of the Benton Engineering Building, the parking lots adjacent to the
South and West of the Building, and the driveway access to the property ("the
property"). When David and Marvel signed and delivered the deeds to
McCarty, they were the sole Trustors and the sole Trustees of the Trust.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

At the District Court, the case was decided on cross motions for summary
judgment. On summary judgment, the case focused primarily on the Quitclaim
Deed. The District Court held a hearing on these motions on September 8, 2014,
and issued a Memorandum Decision on Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment on October 31, 2014. On May 29, 2015, the District Court entered a
Judgment based on its decision on summary judgment. The Judgment included a
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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Rule 54(b) certificate. McCarty then filed her Notice of Appeal on June 3, 2015
(Rat 638)

C.

Respondent Trust's Arguments to the District Court.

The Trust made the following arguments on summary judgment:
1.

The Quitclaim Deed signed and delivered to McCarty
by David and Marvel Benton allegedly contained an
inadequate legal description.

2.

The metes and bounds description later added to the
Deed allegedly "did not close."

3.

David and Marvel Benton signed the Deed without
making note of the fact that they were acting as
Trustees.

4.

An alleged "Second Amendment" to the Trust barred
David Benton from recording the Deed in 2012
without at least one signature from either David II or
Barbara Baker.

As shown below, no legal or factual basis exists for the Trust (David II
and Barbara Baker) to take away title to the property deeded by the Trust to
McCarty on July 1, 2010.
D.

District Court's Decision On Summary Judgment.

The District Court made the following findings and holdings:
1.

The District Court found the legal description in the
Quitclaim Deed to be ambiguous.

2.

After finding the Deed to be ambiguous, the court
incorrectly ruled that resolving ambiguities in the Deed
was a question oflaw.

3.

The court then declared the Deed to be unenforceable as a
matter of!aw - based solely on its belief that it was
ambiguous.

4.

Contrary to well-established Idaho law, the court struck
all evidence which addressed and easily resolved the
perceived ambiguity.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

2·

E.

5.

The court struck all evidence of the Granto rs' intent and
all expert testimony showing that the legal description
was accurate, complete, and sufficient to convey good
title. The court struck all evidence on the grounds that it
was all irrelevant once a finding of ambiguity had been
made.

6.

The Court failed to address Idaho Code § 55-606 which
bars this suit as a matter of law. Section 55-606 bars the
Trust from challenging the sufficiency of its own Deed.

7.

Lastly, the court held that an alleged "Second
Amendment" to the Trust barred David Benton from
recording the Quitclaim Deed or adding an additional
legal description in May of 2012.

Summary of McCarty's Arguments on Appeal.

The following is a summary of McCarty's arguments on appeal.
•

It is undisputed that David and Marvel Benton executed and

delivered both a Quitclaim Deed and a Warranty Deed to McCarty on July 1,
2010.
•

Under Idaho law, signing and delivering a deed is all that is

required to convey title.
•

Idaho law did not require the Quitclaim Deed to be notarized to

convey good title.
•

Idaho law did not require the deed to be recorded to convey good

•

Case law makes clear that David and Marvel Benton were not

title.

required to note on the Quitclaim Deed that they signed the deed in their capacity
as trustees of the Trust.
•

Thus, iawfui title passed to McCarty on July 1, 2010.
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•

Under Idaho Code § 55-606, every grant or conveyance of

real property is conclusive against the grantor, and also against everyone
subsequently claiming under the grantor.
a. This provision of the Idaho Code and case law make clear
that the grantor (the Trust) cannot attack or overturn its own
deed.
b. Since the Trust cannot attack its own Deed, it cannot sustain
this quiet title action, and it should be dismissed as a matter
of law.
c. By law, the Trust cannot execute and deliver deeds to
McCarty and then, years later, after the Trust has been taken
over by David II and Barbara Baker, file a quiet title action
to challenge its own deeds and quiet title to itself This
quiet title action is barred by law and should be dismissed.
d. The District Court failed to address Idaho Code § 55-606 in
any way. Therefore, the court's decision nullifies the
statute.
•

The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the goal of a

court in construing a deed is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
grantor wherever possible. Here, it is undisputed that David and Marvel Benton
intended to and did convey the Benton Engineering Building and adjacent
parking lots to McCarty on July I, 2010.
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•

The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if a legal

description in a deed is found to be ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence is
admissible. Here, the District Court believed the legal description in the July 1,
2010 Quitclaim Deed to be ambiguous. Therefore, the District Court committed
clear error in finding the Granto rs' intent to be irrelevant and striking all
affidavits attesting to the intention of David and Marvel Benton to convey the
Benton Engineering Building and adjacent parking lots to McCarty.
e

Both the plain language of the legal description and the testimony

of numerous licensed civil engineers and land surveyors make clear that the legal
description on the Quitclaim Deed is accurate, complete, and sufficient to convey
good title to the property conveyed.
•

The actions of David Marvel in later having the Quitclaim Deed

notarized and recorded in May of 2012 were not necessary for McCarty to have
valid title as against the Trust. These actions had no effect on McCarty's title.
•

The alleged "Second Amendment" to the Trust was signed on

November 27, 2010 - more than four months after David and Marvel Benton
conveyed the property to McCarty. The alleged amendment purported to prevent
David and Marvel from engaging in any "transaction" involving the Trust
without at least one signature from either David II or Barbara Baker.
•

Since the alleged "Second Amendment" did not exist when the two

deeds were executed and delivered to McCarty on July 1, 2010, it has no bearing
on McCarty's title to the property.
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For all of these reasons, and based on the arguments and authority to
follow, the District Court decision should be reversed and title to the property
should be quieted in McCarty.

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The following facts are undisputed.
•

The Property.

The property at issue is located in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Prior to July
1, 2010, the property was owned by the David and Marvel Benton Trust.
At that time, David and Marvel were the sole Trustors and the sole

Trustees of the Trust.
It is undisputed that on July 1, 2010, David and Marvel Benton
executed and delivered a Quitclaim Deed to the property to their daughter
Dorothy McCarty.
The legal description of the Quitclaim Deed reads as follows:
The property at 550 Linden Drive and the building
known as Benton Engineering building located upon
the property and all adjacent parking lots to the South
of the Building and to the West of the Building and
right of access into the parking lot located at 550
Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho, located in
Bonneville County and more commonly known as the
Benton Engineering Office Building.
July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed, at 1 (Ex. 1 to Aff. of Robert Butler) (Rat
337) (Note: the handwritten interlineations and attached Ex. A to the deed
at R 337-338 were added in May of 2012 as discussed more fully herein.
The original deed was enforceable and passed good title to McCarty
without these elements).
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Based on the plain language of the original legal description, it

cannot be disputed that the deed conveyed the Benton Engineering
building, because it is expressly called out in the deed. Likewise, it
cannot be disputed that the Quitclaim Deed conveyed the parking lots
adjacent to the South and the West of the building and the right of access
(driveway), as those are also expressly called out in the deed.
Lastly, as shown below, the legal description sets clear and
effective boundary lines on all sides, and thus conveys all property within
the boundaries.
•

David And Marvel Benton Intended To Deed The Property
To Dorothy McCarty.

All witnesses who submitted affidavits on this issue uniformly
testified that David and Marvel Benton repeatedly expressed their
intention to deed the subject property to Dorothy McCarty before doing
so. See Defendant McCarty's Reply Brief In Support Of Motion For
Summary Judgment And In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "McCarty Reply Brief') at 11 and the
citations to affidavits therein. (Rat 210 and citations therein). No
contrary evidence was submitted.
•

David And Marvel Benton Deeded The Property To Dorothy
McCarty On July 1, 2010.

It is undisputed that David and Marvel Benton executed and

delivered both a Quitclaim Deed and a Warranty Deed conveying the
property at issue to Dorothy McCarty on July I, 2010. See Exhibits A and
B to the Supp. Aff. of McCarty. (Rat 425 and 430).
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•

David And Marvel Benton Delivered The Deeds To Dorothy
McCarty.

It is undisputed that David and Marvel Benton delivered the

Quitclaim Deed and the Warranty Deed to Dorothy McCarty. Supp. Aff.
of McCarty at 2,

,r,r 4-6 (Rat 402, ,r,r 4-6) (attesting to delivery of both

Quitclaim Deed and Warranty Deed on July 1, 2010).
All other witnesses have uniformly testified that David and Marvel
Benton delivered the Quitclaim Deed to Dorothy McCarty. See McCarty
Reply Brief, at 12 and citations therein. (R at 211 and citations therein).
The Trust has not disputed the fact that David and Marvel Benton
executed and delivered the Quitclaim Deed to Dorothy.
•

The "Second Amendment" to the Trust Was Not in Effect in
July of 2010.

David II and Barbara Baker took control of the Trust on November
27, 2010 by a trumped up "Second Amendment" which the Bentons did
not agree to and did not understand the meaning or intent of the document.
See Supp. Aff. Of McCarty, at 11-14,

Supp. Aff. Of Faler, at 6-10,

,r,r 42-58

,r,r 24-40.

(Rat 411-414,

(Rat 369-373,

,r,r 42-58);

ir,r 24-40).

The

Second Amendment purports to thereafter prevent David and Marvel
Benton from engaging in any "transaction" involving the Trust without a
signature of at least one or both of David II and/or Barbara Baker. Second
Amendment, at 2-3, (attached as Ex. B to the Supp. Faler Aff.) (Rat 387392).
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•

Events of April and May of 2012.

In April of 2012, David Benton discovered that McCarty had not
recorded either the Quitclaim Deed or Warranty Deed. Supp. Aff. Of
McCarty, at 7-9,

,r,r 23-32 (Rat 407-409, ,r,r 23-32).

He then offered to

take care of it for McCarty. Id. David and Marvel then had their July 1,
2010 signatures notarized and recorded the Quitclaim Deed on April 24,
2012. Id.
The Bonneville County Assessor's office then sent a letter to
McCarty claiming that the following clarifications were needed:
"Grantors Must Deed Out Of Trust" and "Legal Description Is Not
Complete." See Ex. D to Supp. Aff. of Dorothy McCarty (Apr. 24, 2012
Letter of Bonn. Cty. Assessor office) (Rat 436).
Therefore, the word "Trust" was handwritten on the Quitclaim
Deed by interlineation so that it reads "THIS INDENTURE is made by
and between, David E. Benton and Marvel C. Benton Trust, the Grantors .
. . ." Quitclaim Deed, at 1 (Ex. 1 to Aff. of Robert Butler) (Rat 337)
( emphasis added). The addition of this single word easily clarified the
property was conveyed from the Trust.
Bonneville County also claimed that the legal description was not
complete. As shown in §§ VII.D and VILE below, this is not true and the
County had no valid reason to request any clarification to the Quitclaim
Deed. Nevertheless, David Benton, a civil engineer and land surveyor of
many decades, added a metes and bounds description which he attached as
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Exhibit A to the original Quitclaim Deed. This reformed deed with the
word Trust and a metes and bounds legal description added, and renotarized, was filed in Bonneville County on May 4, 2013. See Ex. 1 to
Aff. of Robert Butler, at page 1-A (Rat 338). The Deed was then rerecorded with Bonneville County. See id., at 1 (showing second recording
stamp of May 4, 2012) (Rat 337).
•

The Legal Description Marked
Quitclaim Deed Closes. ·

Exhibit "A" In The

One of the Trust's principal arguments to the District Court was its
claim that the metes and bounds legal description added as Exhibit A to
the Quitclaim Deed in May of 2012, did not "close." The expert affidavits
from two licensed professional engineers, two professional land
surveyors, and a senior title officer make clear that the "metes and
bounds" legal description marked as Exhibit "A" in the Quitclaim Deed
definitely closes. See Aff. of Robert B. Butler, P.E., P.L.L.S. at 7-8,

11,r

32-34 (Rat 333-334, 1!1f 32-34); Aff. of Kim Leavitt, P.L.L.S., at 8-9,

,r,r

39-41 (Rat 317-318,
(Rat 307,

of Dennis Jones, P.L.L.S., at 2,

,r,r 4-5); Supp. Aff. of Mr.

(Rat 351-352,
(R at 292,

,r,r 8-9); Aff.

Mike Lund, P.E., at 9-10,

,r,r 4-5

,r,r 42-46

,r,r 42-46); and Supp. Aff. of Laurie Cromwell, at 2, ,r,r 4-6

,r,r 4-6).

In addition, it is undisputed that any legal description, such as the

one in Exhibit A, that calls out a "point of beginning," and then ends with
a return "to the point of beginning" necessarily closes. See Aff. of Robert
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Butler (Rat 334); Aff. of Kim Leavitt (Rat 318); Supp. Aff. of Lund (Rat
352).
The Trust did not refute this evidence, and the District Court did
not question it. Therefore, this issue has been resolved in favor of
McCarty and need not be addressed any further.

IV.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(a)

Did the District Court err in concluding that the Quitclaim Deed did not
convey good title to McCarty when executed and delivered to McCarty on
July 1, 2010?

(b)

Did the District Court err in holding that the 2010 Quitclaim Deed did not
contain an adequate legal description?

(c)

Did the District Court err in failing to apply Idaho Code§ 55-606, which
bars this action as a matter of law because it prohibits the Trust from
challenging its own Deed?

(d)

After finding the July 1, 20 l O Quitclaim Deed ambiguous, did the District
Court err in ruling that resolving ambiguities in a deed is a question of
law?

(e)

Did the court err in striking as irrelevant all evidence of the Grantors'
intent and all evidence resolving the perceived ambiguity in the legal
description and showing the legal description to be accurate, complete,
and sufficient to convey good title?

(f)

Did the District Court err in holding that the "Second Amendment"
invalidated the July 1, 20 IO Quitclaim Deed?

(g)

Did the District Court err in concluding that the doctrines of
"reformation," "interlineation," and "correction deed" did not apply and
could not be used to cure the alleged deficiencies in the 2010 Quitclaim
Deed?

(h)

Is McCarty entitled to her attorney fees and costs on appeal?

V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Pursuant to LA.R. 41, McCarty requests that she be awarded her fees on
appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) on the grounds that
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David II and Barbara Baker brought this action unreasonably and without
foundation. They have clearly acted out of spite and with the wrongful intent to
reverse the express desires of their parents and deprive McCarty of property
deeded to her when her parents were the sole Trustors and Trustees of the Trust.
In addition, their claim for quiet title is directly barred by statute - LC. § 55-606.
VI.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF A DECISION ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
When reviewing a decision decided by a district court on summary

judgment, the Supreme Court "applies the same standard used by the district
court." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 890, 243 P.3d
1069, 1078 (2010). See I.R.C.P. 56(c) (setting forth summary judgment
standard).
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW WHERE A DEED IS FOUND TO BE
AMBIGUOUS.
As held by the Idaho Supreme Court:
When reviewing a district court's interpretation of a
deed, the standard of review "depends on whether the
instrument is ambiguous.1" • • • Whether a deed is
ambiguous is a question of law, over which we
exercise free review ... "Interpretation of an
ambiguous document presents a question of fact, and
we will defer to the findings of the court so long as
those findings are supported by substantial and
competent evidence." However, interpretation of an
unambiguous document is a question of law, and a
matter of free review.

Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8,293 P.3d 630, 632
.
.
't
d) .
1, c1tat10ns
v
..,
om1.te
(2 (11'1)
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In this case, the District Court found the deed ambiguous but rejected all
evidence of the Grantors' intent on the grounds that it was irrelevant. The court
also found the legal description to be ambiguous, and again rejected all evidence
showing both the certainty and clarity of the deed as irrelevant.
The District Court committed additional error in declaring that "an
ambiguous description cannot be submitted to a fact-finder for resolution, the
question of whether a property description must be a legal question for the
Court." Mem. Decision, at 9, n. 22 (Rat 599, n. 22). As just noted, the Idaho
Supreme Court, as recently as 2012, ruled that interpretation of an ambiguous
deed presents a question of fact. Ida-Therm, 154 Idaho at 8, 293 P .3d at 632.
Moreover the District Court's decision is not supported by "substantial
and competent evidence" because it is not based on any evidence. The court
rejected and refused to consider all evidence of the Granto rs' intent and what
was conveyed in the legal description of the Quitclaim Deed.

VII.

A.

ARGUMENT

TITLE TO THE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED TO MCCARTY
ON JULY 1, 2010.
1.

Under Idaho Law, Signing And Delivering A Deed Are AH That
Is Required To Convey Title From Grantor To Grantee.

Under Idaho law, the only requirements to convey title to real
property from grantor to grantee are for the grantor to sign and deliver a
deed to the grantee.
Idaho Code§ 55-601 provides:
55-601. Conveyance - How made. - A conveyance
of an estate in real property may be made by an
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party
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disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto
authorized by writing. The name of the grantee and
his complete mailing address must appear on such
instrument.
LC.§ 55-601. Also, "[b]efore a deed can operate as a valid transfer of
title, there must be a delivery of the instrument and it must be effected
during the life of the grantor." Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 475,
199 P.2d 264, 269 (1948).
Here, it is undisputed that David and Marvel Benton signed and
delivered both a Quitclaim Deed and a Warranty Deed to the Property to
Dorothy McCarty on July 1, 2010. Therefore, title to the Property passed

to McCarty on July 1, 2010 and she has held owned and held title to the
property ever since.
Since the Second Amendment to the Trust did not exist on July 1, 2010, it
has no bearing or effect on McCarty's title to the Property.
2.

Under Idaho Law, A Deed Does Not Need To Be Notarized To
Convey Title From Grantor To Grantee.

Idaho law does not require a deed to be notarized in order to convey title.

See I.C. § 55-601. See also Mollandorfv. Derry, 95 Idaho 1,501 P.2d 199
(1972):
At trial, appellants apparently also contended the lack of
acknowledgment before a notary public by itself vitiated the
deed. Chapters 5 and 6 of Title 55, LC., do not require such an
acknowledgment, except for the purpose ofrecording; hence, the
district court cmTectly rejected this contention.

Id. at 4,501 P.2d at 202. See also Hunt v. Hunt, 110 Idaho 649, 652, 718
P.2d 560, 563 (Ct.App. 1985) (holding that the lack of an
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acknowledgement on a transfer of real property "does not affect a
document's validity as between the parties.").
Here, "the parties" are the Trust and McCarty. Even if the
Quitclaim Deed had never been notarized, it would not affect the validity
of the Deed as between the Trust and McCarty. Since the Deed was not
required to be notarized, none of the actions taken to notarize and record
the Deed in April and May of 2012, after the Second Amendment was in
existence, have any bearing or effect on McCarty's lawful title to the
property.
3.

A Deed Is Not Required To Be Recorded In Order To Convey
Title.

Under Idaho law, a deed is not required to be recorded in order to
convey title. See, e.g., LC. § 55-601 (imposing no recording requirement
for a conveyance of real property); LC. § 55-801 (stating that instruments
involving title to real property "may be recorded," but does not require
recording). Nothing in Title 55, Ch. 8 requires recording for a valid
transfer of title.
The purpose of recording is to protect the original grantee from
claims by subsequent grantees from the same grantor. See LC. § §55-606,
55-812. See also Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 761, 572 P.2d 861,
864 (1977) ("The primary purpose of the recording statutes is to give
notice to others that an interest is claimed in real property, and thus give
protection against bona fide third parties who may be dealing in the same
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property."); Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 160, 525 P.2d 352, 355
(1974) ("recordation is not essential to the validity of a deed").
No subsequent purchaser or grantee exists in this case. Since the
Deed was not required to be recorded, none of the actions taken to record
the Deed after the Second Amendment was in existence have any bearing
or effect on the fact that Dorothy McCarty has held title to the property
since July I, 2010.
4.

McCarty Took Title In July Of 2010. Therefore The November
27, 2010 Second Amendment To The Trust Has No Bearing On
Her Title.

It is clear that McCarty took title to the subject property when David and
Marvel Benton signed and delivered the Deeds to McCarty on July 1, 2010 -

before the Second Amendment to the Trust existed. Neither notarization nor
recording was required to convey title, and neither the Second Amendment,
notarization, nor recording has any bearing on the fact that McCarty has had full
and lawful title to the Property since July 1, 2010.
B.

THE FACT THAT THE BENTONS DID NOT NOTE ON THE
QUITCLAIM DEED THAT THEY WERE SIGNING AS TRUSTEES
HAS NO EFFECT ON THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OR
MCARTY'S TITLE TO THE PROPERTY.
Courts that have addressed this issue have held that a trustee's

failure to note on a deed or other legal document that he or she is signing
in the capacity of "trustee" does not nullify the deed.
In Morse, Trustee in Liquidation for The Two Antique Dealers,

L.L.C. v. Barwick, 84 Va. Cir. 496 (Va.Cir.Ct. 2012), the trustee filed a
breach of contract suit against defendants who had agreed to purchase
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goods from a business entity in liquidation. The defendants argued that
the trustee could not enforce the contract because the "subject contract
does note recite that Christopher N. Morse was acting in his capacity as
trustee in liquidation[.]" Id. at 497. The court rejected this argument:
Assuming that Mr. Morse was the only interest-holder
of 2 Antique Dealers and nobody has offered any
evidence or argument to show otherwise, then he had
the capacity to convey those assets whether he
identified himself as a trustee in liquidation or not.

Id. at 498 (emphasis added). In the case at hand, it is undisputed that David and
Marvel Benton were both the Trustors and the only Trustees when they signed
the Deeds to the subject property on July 1, 2010. Therefore, they had the power
to convey the Property to McCarty whether they identified themselves as
Trustees or not.
In Phillips v. }.fay, 2004 Ohio App. Lexis 5313 (Ohio Ct.App. 2004),
defendant mother entered into contract to sell real property to son. Mother held
the property in a trust. She did not sign the purchase contract as trustee, she was
not sued in her capacity as trustee, and the trust was not made a party to the suit.
Therefore, the mother argued that the land sale contract was unenforceable. The
trial court held that the contract was valid and enforceable. Id. at

* * 1.

The Ohio

Court of Appeals agreed. "The trial court held that although the property was
titled to May as trustee, defendant Frances P. May was the real party in interest"
and, therefore, "Francis P. May, individually and as trustee, is bound by the
terms of the written agreement to sell the real property to [Phillips]." Id. at **22
(brackets in original).
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In affirming the trial court, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted that the
mother was both the only grantor and the only trustor

creating the trust, and

she was the only trustee. It also noted that she did not typically sign documents
involving the property in her capacity as trustee. Id. at **22-23. The court of
appeals concluded "we uphold the trial court's finding that May was the real
party in interest and that May is bound, both individually and trustee, by the
terms of the November 26, 1995 agreement." Id. at **27.
In the case at hand, David and Marvel Bentons were the only Trustors of
the Trust. When they deeded the Property to McCarty, they were the only
Trustees of the Trust. Therefore, David and Marvel Benton were the "real
parties in interest" when they signed the deeds, and the fact that the deeds did
not have a notation that they were signing as Trustees does not have any effect
on the validity of the deeds or McCarty's ownership of the Property in any way.
It is also noteworthy that David and Marvel Benton did not typically sign
documents involving Trust property with any notation that they were doing so in
their capacity as Trustees. See Supp. Aff. of Douglas McCarty, at 2,
278,

,r,r 4-6); Supp. Aff.

of William D. Faler, at 4,

Aff. of Ray McCarty, at 2,
4,

,r 14 (Rat 346, ,r

,r 13

(R at 367,

,r,r 4-6

(Rat

fr 13); Supp.

,r,r 4-6 (Rat 269, friI 4-6); Supp. Aff. of Mike Lund, at

14); Supp. Aff. of Dorothy McCarty, at 3, '119 (Rat 403, fl 9).

In the Afay decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted another opinion by
that court:
In Young v. Louisville Title Agency for N. W.
Ohio, Inc., (Jan. 15, 1993) 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 66,
appellant sought to avoid a land contract by arguing
that the appellee failed to sign "the purchase
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agreement with some indication of her capacity as
sole trustee for the trust which held the title to the
land." Id. at * 13. Again, the court of appeals
rejected the argument noting that the appellee was the
sole trustee of the trust holding title to the land and
that there were no allegations of misrepresentation as
to the true ownership of the land. Id. at * 14.

Phillips v. ]\Jay, at **26-27. Again, David and Marvel Benton were the sole
Trustees of the Trust when they executed and delivered the Deeds to McCarty.
No dispute exists that the property was in the Trust and there has never been any
misrepresentation as to the true ownership of the land. The fact the Ben tons did
not note on the Deeds that they were signing as Trustees does not invalidate the
Deeds in any way. See also Ames v. Fallert, 657 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Or.Ct.App.
1983) (noting that failure to sign as trustee did not affect validity of mortgage)
(citing Smith v. Cram, 230 P. 812 (Or. 1925)).
In Jerome v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 279 S.E.2d 42 (N.C.Ct.App. 1981), the
court held:
Defendant also argues that the second deed of
trust was invalid since B. Diane Vickery did not sign
the instrument in her capacity as trustee for their
children, and thus plaintiffs cannot recover under the
standard mortgage clause quoted above on this deed
of trust. We disagree. A deed executed by the trustee
to convey property held in trust will operate as an
exercise of the trustee's power of disposition
notwithstanding the failure on its face to indicate that
it was executed by the trustee in his capacity as such
when the intent to exercise the power can be inferred
from the transaction. Tocci v. Nowfall, 220 N.C. 550,
18 S.E.2d 225 (1942). Also, the execution of a deed
which would otherwise be ineffective is sufficient
evidence to indicate such an intent. Tocci v. Nowfall,
supra. Under the circumstances of the present case,
B. Diane Vickery clearly intended to sign the second
deed of trust in her capacity as trustee, since she only
held the property as trustee. Thus, her failure to sign
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the second deed of trust in her capacity as trustee did
not affect the validity of the execution of that deed of
trust.

Id. at 46 (emphasis added). Here, David and Marvel. Benton clearly intended to
convey the property in their capacities as Trustees since they only held the

propertv as Trustees and Trustors. Accordingly, their failure to make note that
they were signing the deeds to McCarty as Trustees "did not affect the validity of

the execution" of the deeds. Moreover, the Trust specifically gave the Trustors
(David and Marvel Benton) the power to remove property from the Trust during
their lifetimes. See McCarty Reply Brief, at 36-37 and the citations to the
relevant Trust provisions therein. (R at 235-236).
For these reasons, and based on the authority cited, the Trust's argument
that the Deeds to Dorothy McCarty are invalid because David and Marvel Benton
did not sign as Trustees has no merit, and this quiet title action is barred as a
matter of law.
Moreover, since the Quitclaim Deed came from the Trust and its Trustees,
the Trust is barred by Idaho Code § 55-606 from challenging its own deed.
Therefore, this action is barred as a matter of law, and title to the property
should be quieted in McCarty.

C.

UNDER IDAHO CODE § 55-606, THE QUITCLAIM DEED AND
THE WARRANTY DEED TO DOROTHY MCCARTY ARE
CONCLUSIVE AGAINST THE TRUST. THE TRUST CANNOT
CHALLENGE ITS OWN DEED. THEREFORE, THE TRUST IS
BARRED FROM BRINGING THIS QUIET TITLE ACTION AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Under Idaho Code § 55-606, every grant or conveyance of real

property "is conclusive against the gr an tor," and also against every one
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subsequently claiming under the grantor. In other words, a grantor

In this case, David and Marvel Benton signed and delivered both a
Quitclaim Deed and a Warranty Deed to Dorothy McCarty on July 1,
2010. This occurred months before the Second Amendment to the Trust
existed.
The conveyance by the Bentons occurred when they were both the
Trustors and the only Trustees of the Trust. Therefore, under Idaho law,
the Quitclaim Deed and Warranty Deed are conclusive against the Trust
and, by law, the Trust cannot sustain a quiet title action to challenge or
revoke its own Deed.
In Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157,160,525 P.2d 352,355 (1974),

the Idaho Supreme Court held that "under LC. § 55-606, such conveyance
of real property is conclusive against the grantor and all claiming under
the grantor." See also Carlson v. Stair, 472 P.2d 598, 599 (Wash.Ct.App.
1970) ("The rule is that the grantor may not attack or defeat his own
deed.") (citing Standring v. Mooney, 127 P.2d 401 (Wash. 1942));

Kessinger v. Logan, 779 P.2d 263,267 (Wash. 1989) ("The doctrine of
estoppel applies where there is a purported deed, because it is inequitable
to allow the grantor of the deed to assert a contrary position."). In

Maxwell v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court of Florida held:
As appellant cannot attack her own deed, it is
immaterial to her whether any other error was
committed in the trial of this cause, because she had
no rights in the property, and being estopped to
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impeach her deed, any such error would be harmless
to her.
166 So. 575,576 (Fla. 1936) (emphasis added).
By law, the Trust cannot execute and deliver deeds to McCarty and then,
years later, after the Trust has been taken over by David II and Barbara Baker,
file a quiet title action to challenge its own Deeds and quiet title to itself. This
quiet title action is barred by law and should be dismissed.
The District Court failed to address § 55-606 and its ruling nullifies the
statute and renders it void and of no effect. This result is "'contrary to the
elemental rule that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
provisions, so that no part thereof will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another."' State v.

Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 373, 223 P.3d 750, 756 (2009) (quoting Norton v. Dept.
of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 928, 500 P.2d 825, 829 (1972)).
Since § 55-606 bars this action as a matter of law, the District Court
decision should be reversed and title to the property should be quieted in
McCarty.
D.

THE PROPERTY DESRIPTION ON PAGE 1 OF THE JULY 1, 2010
QUITCLAIM IS ACCURATE, COMPLETE, AND CONVEYS CLEAR
TITLE TO MCCARTY.
1.

The Goal Of The Judicial Process Is To Give Effect To The
Intention Of The Granto rs.

Under Idaho law, in any dispute over a deed, the goal of the courts is to
give effect to the deed and to fulfill the intent of the parties to the deed. See,

e.g., Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006) ("In
interpreting a deed, the court's goal is to carry out the real intention of the
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parties."); Mollandorfv. Derry, 95 Idaho 1, 3, 501 P.2d 199,201 (1972) ("The
policy of the law is not to defeat a grantor's intent.").
2.

In Idaho, Ambiguities In A Legal Description Of A Deed Raise
Questions Of Fact To Be Resolved Through The Granto rs'
Intent And AH Surrounding Circumstances.

Idaho law is well established that any ambiguity or uncertainty in the legal
description in a deed becomes a question of fact and parol evidence is admissible
to show intent. The law is equally clear that any ambiguity in the legal
description is to be construed against the Grantor - in this case the Trust, and in
favor of the Grantee.
In Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 293 P.3d
630, (2012), the Court found that what was and what was not conveyed by the
deed was ambiguous. Id. at 9, 293 P.3d at 633. The Court further declared that
"ambiguous grants in deeds are construed against the grantor." Id. Here, any
ambiguity in what was granted in the Quitclaim Deed to McCarty must be

construed against the Trust and in favor of McCarty.
The Court in Ida-Therm also held that "[i]f a deed contains
inconsistencies that 'throw a 'shadow of ambiguity' over the instrument,' it will
'warrant the introduction of parol evidence as an aid in discovering the intention
of the parties."' Id. at 9,293 P.3d at 634 (quoting Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho
767, 771, 450 P .2d 990, 994 (1969)). Moreover, the decision of a district court
addressing ambiguities must be supported by "substantial and competent
evidence." Ida-Therm, 154 Idaho at 8, 293 P.3d at 632. Here, even though the
District Court believed that what was granted by the Quitclaim Deed was
ambiguous, it rejected all evidence of the Granto rs' intent and all evidence

.
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showing that the legal description was clear and proper in all respects. See §
VII.DA. below (summarizing the affidavit testimony of professional engineers
and land surveyors attesting to the clarity and certainty of the legal description
and conveyance). Therefore the District Court's ruling on summary judgment
should be reversed.

In Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777 P.2d 255, 256 (1989), the Idaho
Supreme Court held as follows:
Where possible, the court should give effect to the
intention of the parties to a deed. Where the language
is plain and unambiguous the intention of the parties
must be determined from the deed itself, and parol
evidence is not admissible to show intent ... If the
language in the deed is ambiguous, the evidence of all
the surrounding facts and circumstances is admissible
to prove the parties' intent. The parol evidence rule
does not preclude the use of extrinsic evidence to
explain the parties' intent when the provisions of a
writing are ambiguous.

Id. at 484, 777 P.2d at 256 (emphasis added). Since parol evidence is
admissible, evidence of all surrounding facts and circumstances is admissible.
The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that this includes evidence relating to
any alleged ambiguity in the legal description.
As previously noted, the District Court held that resolution of an
ambiguous legal description is "a legal question for the Court." Mem. Decision,
at 9, n. 22 (Rat 599, n. 22). This is clearly contrary to this Court's holding in

Ida-Therm, 154 Idaho at 8, 293 P.3d at 632 (holding that in the context of deeds
"[i]nterpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact."). See

also C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001), in which
disputes were raised regarding the meaning and intent of what was granted in a
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deed. In that case, the Supreme Court held that '[w]here a deed is ambiguous,
interpretation of the grantor's intent is a question of fact determined from the
instrument itself as well as from the surrounding facts and circumstance s." The
Court in C & G reiterated the rule that ambiguities in grants in deeds are to be
construed against the grantor. Thus, :McCarty is entitled to have doubts about
the grant in the Quitclaim construed in her favor.
In light of this well-establis hed case law, it was clear error for the District
Court to strike and disregard all testimony as to the Grantors' intent in this case,
particularly on the ground of irrelevance. As previously noted, all testimony
uniformly supported the fact that the Grantors intended to deed the subject
property to McCarty.
Likewise, it is axiomatic that, once the District Court believed that the
legal description of the Quitclaim Deed was ambiguous, it became a question of
fact as to what property the Grantors intended to convey. Therefore, it was again
clear error for the court to disregard testimony as to the Grantors' intent.
Lastly, the legal description was fully adequate and not ambiguous in any
way. See §§ VII.D.4 and VILE. below. It is indisputable that the Grantors
conveyed the Benton Engineering Building, the parking lots adjacent on the
South and West of the building, the right of access ( driveway) to the property,
and all property within the boundaries set by the legal description.

3.

The Trust's Claims That The Legal Description On The
Quitclaim Deed Is Inadequate Have No Merit.

The Trust argues that the Property description on page 1 of the
Quitclaim Deed is insufficient for two reasons. First, the Trust argues that
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a property description that refers to a street address is not sufficient to
convey title. Second, the Trust claims it is confused about what property
was conveyed and, on that basis, argues that the Deed is deficient.
In making its arguments, the Trust relies primarily on Ray v.
Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009). As framed by the Idaho
Supreme Court: "Frasure appeals the district court's ruling that the
physical address in the contract sufficiently described the real property for
purposes of the statute of frauds. We reverse the decision of the district
court and conclude that a property description consisting solely of a
physical address does not satisfy the statute of frauds." Id. at 626, 200
P.3d at 1175 (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court in Frasure also noted the long-standing rule in
Idaho that '" [a] description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as
quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined from the face of
the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it refers."' Id. at
629, 200 P.3d at 1178 (quoting City of Kellogg v. Mission lvftn. Interests, Ltd.
Co., 135 Idaho 239, 244, 16 P.3d 915, 920 (2000)).
The Trust's argument that the property description in the Quitclaim
Deed is deficient has no merit for the following reasons.
First, the property description in the Quitclaim Deed does not
consist solely ofa physical address. On the contrary, the property
description conveys the following:
The property at 550 Linden Drive and the building
known as Benton Engineering building located upon

'
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the property and all adjacent parking lots to the South
of the Building and to the West of the Building and
right of access into the parking lot located at 550
Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho, located in
Bonneville County and more commonly known as the
Benton Engineering Office Building.
July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed, at 1 (Ex. I to Aff. of Robert Butler) (Rat 337) (the
Quitclaim Deed is also attached to most affidavits that discuss the Deed).
The property description clearly conveys the following to McCarty:
•

The Benton Engineering Building;

•

The parking lots located adjacent to South and West of the
Building.

•

The right of access into the parking lot from Linden Drive.
(Since there is only one driveway access to the Property,
there can be no confusion as to what "right of access" is
conveyed).

•

The legal description also sets clear boundaries on all sides
of the property conveyed. Obviously, all property within the
North, East, South, and West boundaries set by the legal
description is included in the conveyance.

This property description is certainly sufficient under Idaho law because
"quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined from the face of
the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it refers."

Frasure, 146 Idaho at 629, 200 P.3d at 1178. It is important to note that the
Idaho rule uses the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and." In other
words, to be sufficient, "quantity," "identity," Q! "boundaries" of property "can
be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic
evidence to which it refers." Id.

In this case, the property description on page l of the Quitclaim Deed
clearly identifies the property conveyed by the Deed. In addition, the boundaries
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of the property conveyed are easily determined from the face of the Deed.
Therefore, the Trust's arguments and the District Court's perceived ambiguities
have no merit and the decision below should be reversed.
4.

The Affidavits Of Licensed Professional Engineers And Land
Surveyors Make Clear That The Legal Description Is (1)
Accurate And Complete; And (2) Superior To A Metes And
Bounds Description.

As explained in the Affidavit of Robert Butler, P.E., P.L.L.S.,
licensed Professional Engineer and Licensed Professional Land Surveyor;
the Affidavit of Kim Leavitt, P.L.L.S., Professional Licensed Land
Surveyor; and the Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Lund, P.E., licensed
Professional Engineer, the property description on page 1 of the Quitclaim
Deed is not only sufficient in all respects, it is superior to the metes and
bounds description and takes precedence over the metes and bounds
description.
Specifically, these experts have explained these key points as follows:
1.

The property description on Page 1 of the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim Deed is
proper and sufficient in all respects. It identifies the street address, city,
county, and state in which the property is located, and meets applicable
standards in the practice of civil engineering and professional land
surveying governing the sufficiency of property descriptions necessary to
convey title.

2.

Based on the description provided, one can clearly and easily determine
what is conveyed by the Quitclaim Deed, using only the face of the deed
and without reference to extrinsic evidence such as statements regarding
the grantors' intent or county records.

3.

This conclusion is based first and foremost on the fact that the property
description begins with reference to a monument - the Benton
Engineering building. The Benton Engineering building monument is
expressly calied out in the Deed. There can be no question that the deed
conveys the building.
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4.

A monument can be either a natural feature like a river or a manmade
object such as a building or other improvement to property. Principles of
civil engineering and land surveying refer to a physical, named object on
the land as a "monument." A monument can be located just the same as a
section corner, and is tied to a specific geographical location. In terms of
the priority of calls in a land survey, monuments have a very high prioritv
of control in a property description.

5.

The Benton Engineering building is named, has the name in metal
lettering inserted in a permanent fashion into the brick of the building,
and meets all the standards to be a monument. The monument is expressly
called out in the Deed. Since the Benton Engineering building monument
is expressly called out in the Deed, the building serves as a control of
boundaries and is readily identified as to location.

6.

The prime requisite for a monument to control over course and distance is
to have it recited in a deed. In order for a monument to be used for a
survey or control in a property description, it must have background,
character, and recognition. The Benton Engineering building has
background having been in existence since 1976, has permanent
lettering which gives it character, and it has recognition based on its
length of existence, recognition in the community, and its relationship to
other known objects, such as Linden Drive and properties to the North and
East.

7.

The Benton Engineering building, expressly called out in the Deed, serves
as an excellent monument from which all property conveyed by the Deed
is easily identified.

8.

Since the property description of the Quitclaim Deed expressly calls out
and includes the Benton Engineering building, the Benton Engineering
building is clearly conveyed by the Deed.

9.

The Deed also calls out additional monuments the paved parking lots to
the South and to the West of the Benton Engineering building. These
monuments are also tied to a specific location and have a clear footprint.
The parking lots are bounded by a curb on the South and the edge of
pavement on the West, and serve as excellent monuments from which the
South boundary line and the West boundary line of the deeded property
are identified.

10.

The South and West parking lot monuments are expressly called out in the
Deed. There is a paved parking lot/curb adjacent to the South of the
Benton Engineering building, and a paved parking lot adjacent to the West
of the Benton Engineering building, with a distinct boundary line between
the parking lot and that of the adjacent undeveloped ground. The parking
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lot monuments called out in the Quitclaim Deed have a definite footprint
and are clearly identified by the language of the Deed.
11.

Like the Benton Engineering building, the parking lot monuments are
expressly called out in the Deed and are improved structures that are
easily identified from the face of the Deed. These monuments clearly
identify the property conveyed by the Deed. Since these monuments are
expressly called out in the property description, they are clearly conveyed
by the Deed.

l 2.

The fact that these parking lots are not precisely "due" South or "due"
West is of no consequence. A simple visit to the site immediately shows
the parking lots. Also, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Butler Aff. (Rat 342)
is an aerial photograph of the property with an arrow indicating North.
This aerial shows that the South and West parking lot monuments are in
fact to the South and the West of the Benton Engineering building
monument. Again, the monuments are expressly called out in the Deed,
have a clear and established footprint, are easily identified using only the
face of the Deed, and are clearly conveyed by the Deed.

13.

The Right of Access called out in the Deed is also a clearly defined and
recognized monument. This monument is a paved driveway and is the
only access to the property described in the Deed - the Benton
Engineering building, and the parking lots to the South and West of the
building.

14.

The Right of Access is expressly called out in the Deed. Therefore, the
Right of Access is clearly conveyed by the Deed.

15.

The North boundary line of the property conveyed in the Quitclaim Deed
is adjacent to another parcel, with a boundary curbing monument and is
located in a City of Idaho Falls recorded plat. The curbing monument
controls the North boundary of the deeded property. There are no
exceptions called out in the Deed.

16.

The East boundary line of the property described in the Quitclaim Deed is
adjacent to a developed city street, Linden Drive, Idaho Falls, Bonneville
County, Idaho. The street has a recorded street easement. The street
monument is expressly called out in the Deed.

17.

The South boundary line is clearly and easily identified by the South
parking lot monument called out in the Deed. This monument is adjacent
to and South of the Benton Engineering building. This monument has a
clear and established footprint, and clearly establishes the South boundary
line of the deeded property.

18.

The West boundary line is easily identified and is called out by express
reference to the parking lot monument to the West of the building. It has
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a clear and established footprint, defined by improved asphalt pavement,
and is adjacent to and West of the Benton Engineering building.
19.

The Benton Engineering building monument, the South parking lot
monument, and the West parking lot monument are expressly called out in
the Quitclaim Deed and are clearly conveyed by the Deed.

20.

According to the rules and principles of surveying, the property
description on Page 1 of the Quitclaim Deed clearly and sufficiently
identifies the property. It identifies the boundaries by calling out
monuments for control, and provides more than sufficient information to
identify the boundaries for all purposes, including the taxing purposes of
the Bonneville County Assessor's office. The plain language of the Deed
and the monuments called out in the Deed are certainly sufficient to
establish North, East, South, and West boundaries for taxing purposes.

21.

The property description on Page 1 of the Quitclaim Deed meets the
standards for property descriptions in the fields of civil engineering and
professional land surveying.

22.

The property description on Page 1 of the Quitclaim Deed is based on call
outs to monuments and is therefore superior to the metes and bounds
description added later at the request of Bonneville County. Calling out
quantity in a deed (by metes and bounds) is the lowest priority of any deed
and the least controlling.

23.

The language of the Deed on Page 1 is superior to a metes and bounds
description because it relies on established monuments and not just
bearings and distances. In addition, because the Deed relies on
monuments, there is no question as to the intent of the Grantor. All
monuments referenced in the Deed are clearly and unequivocally
conveyed by the Deed.

24.

Without question, the property description on Page 1 of the Quitclaim
Deed has superiority of call over the metes and bounds description
attached as Exhibit "A" on Page 1-A of the Quitclaim Deed. It is superior
to and takes precedence over the metes and bounds description requested
by Bonneville County.

See Aff. of Butler, at 2-7,

,r,r 4-27 (Rat 328-333, ,r,r 4-27); Ex. 2 to Aff.

Butler (aerial photograph) (Rat 342); Aff. of Leavitt, at 3-8,
317,

,r,r 10-34); Supp. Aff.

of Lund, at 5-9,
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,r,r 19-41

,-r,r

Of

10-34 (Rat 312-

(Rat 347-351,

,r,I

19-41).

Based on the above, the general rule governing sufficiency of property
descriptions cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in Frasure makes clear that the
property description on Page 1 of the Quitclaim Deed is fully valid and
enforceable.
The Trust attempts to create confusion by referencing other parts of the
Trust property not conveyed to McCarty in the Quitclaim Deed. This is
unavailing. The Deed is expressly limited to the building, the adjacent parking
lots, the driveway access, and the land areas within the boundaries set by the
legal description.
In summary, the property description on page 1 of the July 1, 2010 was
prepared by a licensed professional engineer, David E. Benton. Now, two other
licensed professional engineers - Robert Butler and Mike Lund, and a
professional licensed land surveyor

Kim Leavitt, have reviewed the property

description and confirmed that it complies with all standards in the fields of civil
engineering and professional land surveying. They have also confirmed that the
property conveyed by the Quitclaim Deed can be easily identified using only the
face of the Deed, and that the property description is sufficient to convey title.
They have also confirmed that the property description is superior to and takes
precedence over the metes and bounds description added later at the request of
Bonneville County.
Without question, the Quitclaim Deed conveys the Benton Engineering
building to McCarty. It does so expressly. The same is true as to the adjacent
parking lots to the South and West of the building, and the driveway access to
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the Property. These monuments are expressly called out in the Deed and are,
therefore, expressly conveyed by the Deed. Also, all property within the
boundaries set by the Deed are included in the conveyance.
As Idaho case law and the expert opinions make clear, no grounds exist
for revoking Dorothy McCarty's title to the subject Property, particularly based
on the Trust's unsupported argument that the property description on page I of
the Quitclaim Deed is "insufficient" based on its own trumped up "confusion"
about what was so clearly conveyed. McCarty's parents, Trustors and Trustees
of the Trust, intended her to have this property, and executed and delivered two
Deeds conveying the Property to her.
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S PERCEIVED AMBIGUITY IN THE
LEGAL DESCRIPTION HAS NO FOUNDATION AND IS CLEARLY
RESOLVED BY THE EXPERT TESTIMONY.
In its opinion on summary judgment, the District Court stated:
[I]t is unclear whether "the property at 550 Linden
Drive" does or does not include the curtilage (or grass
area) surrounding the building as well as the strip of
grass separating the west parking lot from the property
north of the Property ... As further evidence of this
ambiguity, the long grass strip extending along the west
paved parking lot is not positioned next to the building
and could logically be excluded because it might
reasonably be considered part of the neighboring lot ...
Moreover, the description provides for a "right of access
into the parking lot," but a map submitted at oral
argument shows that the parking lot touches a public
road, so it is unclear what purpose this apparent easement
might serve.

Mem. Decision, at 9 (R at 599).
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These perceived ambiguities have no basis in fact. The affidavits of the
licensed professional civil engineers and land surveyor make the following
points clear. These points are also undisputed:
The North boundary line of the property conveyed in the Quitclaim
Deed is adjacent to another parcel, with a boundary curbing
monument and is located in a City of Idaho Falls recorded plat.
The curbing monument controls the North boundary of the deeded
property. There are no exceptions called out in the Deed. Butler
Aff. at 5, ,r 18 (Rat 331, ,r 18); Leavitt Aff., at 6, ,r 25 (Rat 315, ,r
25); Supp. Lund Aff. at 8, ,r 33 (Rat 350, ,r 33).

e

e

The East boundary line of the property described in the Quitclaim
Deed is adjacent to a developed city street, Linden Drive, Idaho
Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. The street has a recorded street
easement. The street monument is expressly called out in the Deed.
Butler Aff. at 5, ,r 19 (Rat 331, ,r 19); Leavitt Aff., at 6, ,r 26 (Rat
315, ,r 26); Supp. Lund Aff. at 8, ,r 34 (Rat 350, ,r 34).

•

The South boundary line is clearly and easily identified by the
South parking lot monument called out in the Deed. This
monument is adjacent to and South of the Benton Engineering
building. This monument has a clear and established footprint, and
clearly establishes the South boundary line of the deeded property.
Butler Aff. at 5, ,I 20 (Rat 331, ,r 20); Leavitt Aff., at 6, ,r 27 (Rat
315 ,r 27); Supp. Lund Aff. at 8, ,r 35 (Rat 350, ,r 35).

e

The West boundary line is easily identified and is called out by
express reference to the parking lot monument to the West of the
building. It has a clear and established footprint, defined by
improved asphalt pavement, and is adjacent to and West of the
Benton Engineering building. Butler Aff., at 5-6, ,r 21 (Rat 33132, ,r 21 ); Leavitt Aff., at 6- 7, ,r 28 (Rat 315-16, ,r 28); Supp. Lund
Aff., at 8, ,r 36 (Rat 350, i!36).

In short, the legal description in the Quitclaim Deed sets the North, East,
South, and West boundaries of the property conveyed. Obviously, once the
boundaries are set, all property within those boundaries is conveyed. Therefore,
the District Court's questions of whether areas inside the boundaries are included
are simply erroneous and have no basis or foundation.
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The District Court's discussion of the "right of access" being some sort of
easement is also clearly erroneous. The "right of access" is the existing
driveway into the parking lot of the Benton Engineering building. It is not some
other, undefined easement. As explained by the experts:
The Right of Access called out in the Deed is also a clearly
defined and recognized monument. This monument is a
paved driveway and is the only access to the property
described in the Deed - the Benton Engineering building,
and the parking lots to the South and West of the building.
Butler Aff. at 5,

,r

16 (Rat 331

Supp. Lund Aff. at 7,

,r 31

,r 16); Leavitt Aff., at 6, ,r 23

(Rat 349,

(Rat 315,

,r 23);

,r 31).

The Quitclaim Deed is clear and unambiguous. It sets clear boundaries
on the North, East, South, and West. The District Court could have easily
resolved its perceived ambiguities in the legal description by simply reading the
expert affidavits. Once it believed the Deed was ambiguous, the District Court
had a duty to look to extrinsic evidence to resolve the perceived ambiguities.
Instead, the District Court rejected all evidence as irrelevant based on a
mistaken belief that resolution of ambiguities is a question of law which cannot
be resolved by reference to extrinsic evidence. This is plain error and the
decision of the court should be reversed.
F.

BONNEVILLE COUNTY HAD NO VALID REASON TO REQUEST
THAT A "METES AND BOUNDS" DESCRIPTION BE ADDED TO
THE QUITCLAIM DEED.
As stated by experts Robert Butler, Kim Leavitt, and Mike Lund,

Bonneville County had no justifiable reason to request that a metes and bounds
description be added to the Quitclaim Deed. Buder Aff., at 7,
333,

if'll 28-31

(R at

,r,r 28-31); Leavitt Aff., at 8, ,r,r 35-38 (Rat 317, ,r,r 35-38); Supp. Lund
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Aff., at 10-11, ,r,r 48-54 (Rat 352-353,

,r,r 48-54).

The evidence shows that this

requirement was a result of undue influence by Barbara Baker over an employee
at the Assessor's office, Mr. Todd Simon, and Mr. Simon's resulting antagonism
toward and stonewalling of Dorothy McCarty. Supp. Lund Aff. at 10-11,
48-53); Supp. Aff. of Dorothy McCarty, at 20-22,

53 (Rat 352-353,
(Rat 420-422,

411,r 48-

,r,r 83-89

,r,r 83-89).

Moreover, as attested to by the experts, the original property description
on Page 1 of the Quitclaim Deed is superior to and takes precedence over the
metes and bounds description that was added later. Butler Aff. at 6- 7,
(Rat 332-333,

,r,r 25-27

fifi 25-27); Leavitt Aff., at 7-8, ,r,r 32-34 (Rat 316-317, ,r,r 32-34);

Supp. Lund Aff. at 9,

,r,r 39-41

(Rat 351,

,r,r 39-41).

These experts have prepared, filed, and seen countless property
descriptions in deeds that were accepted for recording by Idaho counties that did

not have metes and bounds descriptions. Butler Aff. at 7,
Leavitt Aff., at 8,

,r 31

(Rat 333,

,r 38 (Rat 317, ,r 38); Supp. Lund Aff. at 10, ,r 47

,r 31);

(Rat 352,

,r

47).
As stated by the experts, some counties, like Bonneville County, like to
use computer software that is easier to use with metes and bounds descriptions.
Butler Aff. at 7,

,r 29

(Rat 333,

,r 29); Leavitt Aff., at 8, ,r 36 (Rat 317, ,r 36).

However, nothing in the Idaho Code or Idaho case law gives Idaho
counties authority to demand a metes and bounds description, or authority to
disregard or fail to give force and effect to a deed that contains a true and
accurate property description that is not a metes and bounds description. This
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lack of authority is also made clear by the Frasure case cited by the Trust, which
holds that "'[a] description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as
quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined from the face of
the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it refers."' Ray v.

Frasure, 146 Idaho at 629, 200 P.3d at 1178. Frasure makes clear that a metes
and bounds description is not the only type of property description that may be
used in deeds and is the only form of description that conveys valid title.
G.

THE MINOR CHANGES MADE TO THE QUITCLAIM DEED AT
THE REQUEST OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY WERE
UNNECESSARY AND HAD NO EFFECT ON THE VALIDITY OF
MCCARTY'S TITLE.
As noted above, Bonneville County's request for a metes and bounds

description was unnecessary and the metes and bounds description is inferior to a
legal description based on call outs to monuments according to both the fields of
professional civil engineering and professional land surveying. See § VILE.
above.
Also at the request of Bonneville County, the word "Trust" was added to
the Quitclaim Deed. As noted above, it was not necessary for David and Marvel
Benton to indicate that they were signing as Trustees because the property was in
the Trust and they were the only Trustors and Trustees at the time of executing
and delivering the Quitclaim Deed to McCarty on July I, 2010.
In addition, when David and Marvel Benton had their signatures
notarized in April and May of 2012, the notaries public affirmed that they
had signed in their capacities as Trustees. See McCarty Reply Brief, at
32-33 and citations therein. (R at 231-232). Also, as explained in detail
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in McCarty's Reply Brief, it was not necessary that the notaries be present
when the Bentons signed the Quitclaim Deed. Rather, the law makes clear
that the Bentons only needed to be present when they had their signatures
notarized). See McCarty Reply Brief, at 33-36 and citations therein. (Rat
232-235).
H.

EVEN IF DEEMED NECESSARY, THE MINOR CHANGES TO THE
QUITCLAIM DEED ARE AUTHORIZED AND ENFORCED UNDER
THE LEGAL DOCTRINES OF REFORMATION, CORRECTION
DEED, AND/OR CORRECTION BY INTERLINEATION.
The legal description on the face of the Quitclaim Deed meets all

professional standards and requirements, and is clearly sufficient to convey title
to McCarty. See § VII.DA. above. Therefore, the subsequent addition of a
metes and bounds description was not necessary. It also was not necessary for
David and Marvel Benton to note on the Quitclaim Deed that they were signing
in their capacities as Trustees. See § VII.B. above.
Even if these minor changes were deemed necessary, they are authorized
and enforceable under the legal doctrines of reformation, interlineation, and
correction deeds. See McCarty Reply Brief, at 39-50 and citations therein. (Rat
238-249). Moreover, changes authorized by these doctrines relate back to the
date of the original execution of the deed. See McCarty Reply Brief, at 44-45,
49-50 and citations therein. (Rat 243-244, 248-249). Therefore, it would be
improper to use the Second Amendment to the Trust, executed well after the date
and delivery of the Quitclaim Deed, to negate these minor changes.
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I.

THE "SECOND AMENDMENT" TO THE TRUST HAS NO
BEARING OR EFFECT ON McCARTY'S TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY
The Trust's Argument Based On The Second Amendment To
The Trust.

1.

The Trust argues that the Second Amendment to the Trust invalidates
McCarty's title to the property. The Trust bases this argument on the fact that
David and Marvel Benton had their signatures on the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim
Deed notarized and recorded the Deed in April and May of 2012. The Trust
contends that the Bentons could not take such actions without the signature of at
least one of David Benton II or Barbara Baker

2.

The Trust's Arguments Fail For Numerous Reasons.
•

@

Title to the property passed to McCarty when the Bentons signed
and delivered the Quitclaim Deed on July 1, 2010.
The Quitclaim Deed did not have to be recorded in order to pass
title.

•

The Quitclaim Deed did not have to be notarized in order to pass
title.

•

Therefore, the actions in April and May of2012 were unnecessary
and had no effect on the validity of McCarty's title.

•

The Second Amendment only prohibited David and Marvel Benton
from engaging in a new "transaction" without a signature from
David II or Barbara Baker. Having the July 1, 2010 Quitclaim
Deed notarized and recorded was not a "new transaction." The
transaction was complete on July 1, 2010 upon the Benton's
execution and delivery of the Quitclaim Deed to McCarty. What
would David II or Barbara Baker have "signed" in April or May of
2012? No new deed was prepared or executed. There was nothing
for David II or Barbara Baker to sign.

•

Title to the property passed on July 1, 2010, over four months
before the Second Amendment existed. Therefore, the Second
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Amendment has no bearing whatsoever on McCarty's title to the
property.
®

Even if deemed necessary, the minor changes to the Quitclaim
Deed relate back to July 1, 2010, and the Second Amendment has
no effect on McCarty's title. As held in Sartain, "the correction
deed then becomes effective as of the date of the original deed."
Sartain v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 272,
775 P.2d 161, 164 (Ct.App. 1989)

•

The Quitclaim Deed and the Warranty Deed are conclusive
against the Trust. It cannot challenge its own Deeds in a
quiet title action. See Idaho Code § 55-606, discussed in
detail in § VII.C. above.

•

Nothing in the law required the Bentons to re-sign the
Quitclaim Deed due to the clarifications to the Deed.
Neither reformation, correction deed, nor interlineation
requires either a new instrument or new signatures. The
very deed relied on by the Trust for its claim to title
demonstrates this. That deed was corrected without either an
"acknowledgement" by the grantors or new signatures by the
grantors. See Ex. C to the Supp. Aff. of Laurie Cromwell (R
at 305).

•

Nothing in the language of the Second Amendment indicates
that having signatures acknowledged on a Deed executed
and delivered before the Second Amendment existed
constitutes a "transaction" bringing the Second Amendment
into play. The Second Amendment does not define
"transaction" and it does not contain any provision making it
apply retroactively. Here, the only "transaction" was the
conveyance of the Property by the Benton Trust to McCarty
on July 1, 2010.

•

The plain language of the provision of the Second
Amendment relied on by David II and Barbara Baker (acting
as the Trust) squarely refutes their argument that the Second
Amendment barred the actions of David and Marvel Benton
in May of 2012. The provision relied upon only applies if
the Bentons are "disabled" at the time of the "transaction."
See McCarty Reply Brief (Rat 258-260 and citations
therein). It is undisputed that neither David nor Marvel
Benton were "disabled" on May 4, 2012. See id. at 61-62 (R
at 260-61).
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o11

Since the Second Amendment was drafted by an attorney
hired by David II and Barbara Baker, ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of McCarty, the party against whom the
amendment is being applied. The amendment does not
define either "disabled" or "transaction." Under Idaho law,
when language is ambiguous, the language "should be
construed most strongly against the party ... employing the
words concerning which doubt arises." J.R. Simplot Co. v.
Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 616, 167 P.3d 748, 753 (2006)
(emphasis added). See also Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v.
Schrock, 150 Idaho 817, 821, 252 P.3d 98, 102 (2011)
(ambiguities found in legal documents that one party had no
part in drafting and which were not subject to negotiation
between the parties, are to be "strongly construed" against
the party who drafted the document).

In summary, the Second Amendment does not apply or have any
effect in this case. Therefore, the District Court's decision using the
Second Amendment to revoke McCarty's title should be reversed.

VIII. CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, and based on the authority cited, the District
Court decision should be reversed and title to the property should be quieted in
McCarty.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of February, 2016.

ohn M. Ohman, of the firm
Attorneys for Appellant
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depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage
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Gary L. Cooper, Esq.
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
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P.O. Box 4229
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